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Strategic environmental policy under free trade with transboundary pollution
Abstract
We analyze the effects of free trade on environmental policies in a strategic setting with
transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in envi-
ronmental outcomes, making both countries worse off. With command and control policies
(quotas), there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable permits, un-
less pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy.
In our model carbon leakage alone, and not a terms of trade motive, drives countries to re-
lax domestic environmental policy. Quantity-based tools strictly welfare-dominate price-based
tools under free trade.
1 Introduction
A serious concern about the relationship between trade and environmental policy is that these two
issues have usually been dealt with separately in real-world bilateral or multilateral agreements.
When trade agreements forbid the use of trade policies to pursue terms of trade goals, governments
may use domestic environmental policies as a second best method of pursuing their terms of trade
objectives. Other reasons that might motivate the distortion of domestic environmental policies
are the competition to attract more industries (capital) from countries with stricter policies and
to capture rents from foreign firms in the presence of imperfect competition. While prior research
has shown that when there are no transboundary externalities negotiating tariffs, in conjunction
with commitments to market access, can lead to efficiency (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger
(2001)), efficiency will not result from trade agreements alone when there are transboundary
externalities. In this paper we explore the effects of trade liberalization on environmental outcomes
and welfare, in the presence of transboundary pollution, when environmental policy is set non-
cooperatively.
The literature on trade and environmental policy in the presence of an international spillover
of emissions is too vast to be adequately surveyed here. Some papers assume the pollution
externality affects firm productivity, whereas other papers assume the externality hurts households
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(an “eyesore” externality). Papers also differ in terms of the policy tools allowed (domestic policies,
border policies, or both), the number of policy active countries, and in terms of country size. Since
we investigate how, in the presence of an eyesore transboundary externality, the movement from
autarky to free trade affects domestic policy and welfare, our literature review focuses on papers
with similar structures.
Markusen (1975), one of the first papers to address transboundary pollution, considers one
policy active country that uses both tariffs and domestic policy to influence the terms of trade
and global pollution output. Rauscher (1997) derives the optimal environmental tax under free
trade for a large country that suffers from transboundary pollution. He finds that “carbon leak-
age” occurs if stricter domestic environmental policy leads to increases in foreign emissions and
concludes that with “substantial leakage effects, optimal environmental policies tend to lead to
too low emission tax rates” when the pure terms of trade effects are small compared to leakage ef-
fects. However, he considers the case in which only one country is policy active. Copeland (1996)
considers a small country (A) which suffers transboundary pollution from production of its import
good in a neighboring economy (B). Since both countries are small and there are transports costs
between the ROW and these two countries, then import tariffs in A will not affect production in
B, provided B exports to ROW. However, an import tariff on pollution content can change the
way in which B produces output, and hence can reduce the amount of transboundary pollution1.
Ludema and Wooton (1994) consider strategic policy in a two country asymmetric trade
model with transboundary pollution. Foreign production, which is exported to the home country,
generates eyesore pollution that affects only the home country. Under a free trade agreement
the foreign country - which is not affected by the pollution - implements environmental policies
to manipulate its terms of trade, while the home country uses process standards2 to improve its
1If foreign output and pollution were in a one-to-one correspondence, then the tariff on imports and tariff on
pollution content would be identical.
2As the authors themselves note, such standards would be in violation of WTO rules, so we are not sure if such
policies would be viable under free trade.
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terms of trade and restrict the incidence of transboundary pollution.
Copeland and Taylor (1995) study a Heckscher-Ohlin two good, two factor model in which
eyesore pollution is one of two primary inputs. Assuming pollution is a pure global public good
and that there is free trade, they evaluate the welfare implications of trade when countries non-
cooperatively choose their environmental policy, pollution permits. They find that, as compared
to autarky, emissions in the South rise and emissions in the North fall; aggregate world pollution
rises if trade does not lead to factor price equalization (FPE), while under FPE aggregate world
pollution is unaffected by trade. Allowing free trade in pollution permits across countries guaran-
tees FPE and hence eliminates the possibility that global emissions increase. While most of the
paper assumes countries ignore the effect of their policies on world prices3, even when countries
take into account this effect, the equilibrium coincides with the earlier case because of the pure
global public good nature of pollution. We derive a similar result in our model, as a special case,
in Section 5.3.
Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003) consider strategic interactions between two closed economies
with respect to environmental policies. Emissions (a by-product of production) cause global warm-
ing that reduces welfare in both countries. They find emission taxes and quotas are equivalent,
while emission standards lead to over-production of the polluting good. Ishikawa and Kiyono
(2006) compare these policies instruments under free trade, but they use a non-strategic setting
in which only one country uses environmental policy. Kiyono and Ishikawa (2004) specify a partial
equilibrium model in which two large countries import fuel, an input in the production of a final
good. Emissions, a by-product of the use of fuel in production, add to global pollution, which
reduces welfare in both importing countries. Regulation of emissions only by the home country
leads to carbon leakage, as changes in the world price of fuel affect pollution emissions in the
other country. Because of strategic effects, they find world pollution is lower when both countries
3In essence, they assume there are a large number of Northern and a large number of Southern countries.
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use quotas, rather then taxes, to regulate emissions. In their model the terms of trade and the
carbon leakage effect reinforce each other. In general, if these motives work in different directions
in any one country, then it is not possible to infer the net effect on pollution and welfare. In our
open economy model, with no terms of trade effects in equilibrium, it is purely the carbon leakage
effect that drive the results.
We use a two good, two country trade model to analyze the effects of liberalizing trade while
leaving domestic policy unconstrained in the presence of transboundary pollution. We assume
production of good (X) in either country generates eyesore pollution which reduces welfare in both
countries. There are three potential distortions in our model: first, there is a production distortion,
a domestic externality that drives a wedge between the private and social costs in one sector.
Second, countries are large and hence have incentives to manipulate their terms of trade and
lastly, the presence of transboundary pollution implies an efficient allocation cannot be achieved
when countries practice free trade but set domestic environmental policies non-cooperatively.
Within this framework we compare the effects of environmental taxes and quotas when coun-
tries set policy non-cooperatively. We find that, if governments use taxes, the movement from
autarky to free trade can result in an equilibrium in which both countries use lower taxes and
achieve lower welfare than under autarky. This race to the bottom occurs not because of the
terms of trade effect (as there is no trade in equilibrium), but rather because - in a strategic
setting in an open economy - the government relaxes environmental taxes to reduce the incidence
of transboundary pollution from abroad (i.e., to reduce “carbon leakage” in the free trade equi-
librium). This race to the bottom does not occur when (globally nontradable) emission quotas,
rather then taxes, are used. However, if international trade in emission permits is allowed, then a
race to the bottom will occur if pollution is not a pure global public bad4. Thus, we find that in
4If the marginal damage in the home country from foreign emissions is positive, but less than that from domestic
emissions, then there is transboundary pollution but it is not a pure global public bad.
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the symmetric free trade equilibrium, pollution is lowest with internationally nontradable quotas
and highest when taxes are used to regulate emissions, and we also find that the emissions quota
equilibrium is strictly welfare-superior to the emissions tax equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2 and Section
3 derives the autarky equilibrium. Section 4 looks at the efficient equilibrium, while Section 5
explores the strategic free trade equilibrium, and compares pollution and welfare under different
policy instruments. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We conduct our analysis using a standard two good (X,Y ) model of trade between two countries,
a home country and a foreign country (denoted by *). The production possibility frontier of the
home country is
g(x, y) ≥ 0; gi < 0, i = x, y (1)
The foreign production possibility frontier is similar. Emissions are a by-product of the production
of X; good Y does not pollute. We assume that production of one unit of X generates α units of
emissions in the country of production and, due to transboundary pollution, αˆ units of emissions
in the other country. Thus, total pollution in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
z = αx+ αˆx∗, z∗ = αˆx+ αx∗; αˆ ∈ (0, α] (2)
When α < αˆ, domestic emissions cause a higher marginal damage in the home country than
foreign emissions, while pollution is a pure global public bad if α = αˆ.
Let cx and cy denote consumption of X and Y in the home country. Preferences of the
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representative agent in the home country are given by a twice differentiable concave utility function
U(cx, cy, z) = φ(cx, cy)− δz; φcx , φcy , δ > 0 (3)
Foreign country preferences are similar.
3 Autarky
We first solve the domestic social planner’s problem. Assuming home and foreign actions are taken
simultaneously, the benevolent home government maximizes its own citizen’s welfare, which yields
the following optimality condition (since in autarky x = cx and y = cy)
gx
gy
=
φx − αδ
φy
(4)
i.e., the domestic rate of transformation equals the social marginal rate of substitution, taking into
account the effect of emissions on domestic welfare. However, private agents in the economy do not
take into account the domestic distortion in their decision making process. Profit maximization
implies
pfx
pfy
=
gx
gy
(5)
where pfx and p
f
y are the producer prices of X and Y respectively. Producers equate the domestic
rate of transformation to the producer price ratio. Utility maximization by consumers leads to
the following optimality condition
pcx
pcy
=
φx
φy
(6)
where pcx and p
c
y are the consumer prices of X and Y respectively. Consumers equate the marginal
rate of substitution to the consumer price ratio. Comparing the optimality conditions of the social
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planner, producers and consumers, Eq.’s (4), (5) and (6) respectively, it is clear that the best
solution is a tax on domestic emissions
taz =
δ
φy
(7)
i.e., a tax on emissions equal to the domestic marginal damage of emissions. Given the one-to-one
correspondence between output and emissions, this emission tax is equivalent to a tax on the
output of X, which in our case is
ta =
αδ
φy
(8)
Note that this autarky solution is inefficient from the global perspective as governments do not
internalize the transboundary effect of their emissions.
4 Efficient Equilibrium
To obtain Pareto efficient allocations we solve a social planner’s problem that maximizes the
welfare of the home country subject to meeting a certain utility target for the foreign country.
Naturally, the social planner accounts for the domestic and transboundary externalities. The
social planner’s problem yields the following optimality conditions
φcx
φcy
=
φc∗x
φc∗y
(9)
gx
gy
=
φcx
φcy
−
[
αδ
φcy
+
αˆδ
φc∗y
]
(10)
gx∗
gy∗
=
φc∗x
φc∗y
−
[
αˆδ
φcy
+
αδ
φc∗y
]
(11)
The marginal rate of substitution is equated across countries and the domestic rate of transfor-
mation in each country is equated to the social marginal rate of substitution, taking into account
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the effect of emissions on both countries. Hence, the Pareto efficient tax on emissions is
tez =
[
δ
φcy
+
δ
φc∗y
]
; te∗z =
[
δ
φc∗y
+
δ
φcy
]
(12)
i.e., a tax equal to the sum of marginal damages in the two countries. This tax is equivalent to a
tax on the production of the polluting good, X
te =
[
δα
φcy
+
δαˆ
φc∗y
]
; te∗ =
[
δα
φc∗y
+
δαˆ
φcy
]
(13)
Hence, efficiency need not require equalization of environmental taxes across countries, but it does
require that both countries internalize the domestic and transboundary effects of emissions5.
5 Free Trade
In this section we analyze the effects of a movement from autarky to free trade and how the
choice of the policy instrument governs these effects. We consider each country’s optimal non-
cooperative environmental policy, given that they have committed to free trade6 and that they
act simultaneously. We consider three cases: i) governments regulate emissions using a tax on
domestic emissions (equivalent to a tax on the production of X), ii) emission (or production)
quotas are used to regulate pollution, and these quotas are not tradable across countries, and iii)
internationally tradable quotas are the environmental policy instruments. Finally, we compare
pollution and welfare under these different instruments.
5If α > αˆ, then te > te∗ if, and only if, φc∗y > φcy .
6This can be due to trade agreements that restrict the use of trade policies.
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5.1 Taxes
The only policy instrument available to each country is a tax on emissions. Given the one-to-one
correspondence between output and emissions, this is equivalent to a tax on the production of
X, denoted by t and t∗, and we carry out our analysis in the rest of the paper using equivalent
production policies. Let px and py be the (world) consumer prices of X and Y respectively. Let
good Y be the numeraire, hence we set py ≡ 1. The GNP functions for the home and foreign
countries are, respectively,
R(px − t); R∗(px − t∗)
The expenditure functions for the home country and the foreign country are7
e(px, u+ δ{αx+ αˆx∗}); e∗(px, u∗ + δ{αˆx+ αx∗})
Equilibrium is described by the income constraints (balance of trade constraints) for the two
countries and a market clearing condition:
e(px, u+ δ{αx+ αˆx∗}) = R(px − t) + tx (14)
e∗(px, u∗ + δ{αˆx+ αx∗}) = R∗(px − t∗) + t∗x∗ (15)
epx + e
∗
px = x+ x
∗ (16a)
x = Rpx−t (16b)
x∗ = R∗px−t∗ (16c)
7Due to the presence of the externality, the expenditure function is given by: mincx,cy (pxcx+ cy) s.t. φ(cx, cy)−
δz ≥ u⇒ mincx,cy (pxcx + cy) s.t. φ(cx, cy) ≥ u+ δz.
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where Eq.’s (14), (15) and (16) are the resource constraints for the home and foreign countries,
and the market clearing condition, respectively. We assume that governments simultaneously
and non-cooperatively choose their domestic tax to maximize welfare. Also, all tax revenues are
redistributed lump-sum to consumers.
Taking the total differential of Eq.’s (14) and (16b), and combining we have
eudu+ (euαδ − t)dx+ euαˆδdx∗ = (Rp − epx)dpx; dx = S′(dpx − dt) (17)
where we define Rpx−t as Rp, and Rpp as S′. Similarly totally differentiating Eq.’s (15) and (16b),
we have
e∗u∗du
∗ + (e∗u∗αδ − t∗)dx∗ + e∗u∗αˆδdx = (R∗p∗ − e∗px)dpx; dx∗ = S∗
′
(dpx − dt∗) (18)
where we define R∗px−t∗ as R
∗
p∗ , and R
∗
p∗p∗ as S
∗′ .
Differentiating Eq. (14) with respect to t we get the home country’s best response function
as a function of the foreign country’s tax
eu
du
dt
= (Rp − epx)
dpx
dt
+ (t− euαδ)dx
dt
− euαˆδ dx
∗
dt
(19)
The first term, the terms of trade effect, depends on whether the country is a net importer of
X. The second term is the effect of changes in t on domestic pollution: as t increases, domestic
emissions decline. An increase in the domestic environmental tax reduces domestic production of
the polluting good resulting, under trade, in an increase in px, which increases foreign production
and emissions. Thus, the last term reflects the carbon leakage effect.
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Similarly the best response function of the foreign country is given by
e∗u∗
du∗
dt∗
= (R∗p∗ − e∗px)
dpx
dt∗
+ (t∗ − e∗u∗αδ)
dx∗
dt∗
− e∗u∗αˆδ
dx
dt∗
(20)
Note that Eq.’s (19) and (20) can also be solved for the optimal autarky production taxes. In
autarky domestic production equals domestic consumption, i.e., Rp(.) = epx(.), and foreign output
is independent of domestic policy, i.e., dx
∗
dt = 0; hence, from Eq. (17) we have eu
du
dt = (t−euαδ)dxdt .
Since dxdt < 0 and eu > 0, it follows that the optimal autarky tax for the home country is
ta = euαδ (21)
Similarly the optimal autarky tax in the foreign country is
ta∗ = e∗uαδ (22)
However, with free trade both x and x∗ are affected by the environmental policy in the other
country. Totally differentiating Eq. (16) yields, after simplification:
epxudu+ e
∗
pxu∗du
∗ + [(β + β∗) + S′(epxuαδ + e
∗
pxu∗αˆδ) + S
∗′(epxuαˆδ + e
∗
pxu∗αδ)]dpx
= [S′(epxuαδ + e
∗
pxu∗αˆδ)− S′]dt+ [S∗
′
(epxuαˆδ + e
∗
pxu∗αδ)− S∗
′
]dt∗ (23)
where we define β ≡ epxpx − S′ < 0 and β∗ ≡ e∗pxpx − S∗
′
< 0.
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Eq.’s (17), (18) and (23) can be written in matrix form as

eu 0 S′(euαδ − t) + S∗′euαˆδ +Mx
0 e∗u S∗
′
(e∗u∗αδ − t∗) + S′e∗u∗αˆδ +M∗x
epxu e
∗
pxu∗ (β + β
∗) + S′(epxuαδ + e∗pxu∗αˆδ) + S
∗′(epxuαˆδ + e∗pxu∗αδ)


du
du∗
dpx

=

S′(euαδ − t)dt+ S∗′euαˆδdt∗
S∗′(e∗u∗αδ − t∗)dt∗ + S′e∗u∗αˆδdt
[S′(epxuαδ + e∗pxu∗αˆδ)− S′]dt+ [S∗
′
(epxuαˆδ + e∗pxu∗αδ)− S∗
′
]dt∗
 (24)
where Mx = epx −Rp is the imports of the home country. In equilibrium we have Mx +M∗x = 0.
The above system can be inverted and solved. However, to simplify the calculations, we assume
quasi-linear preferences (so that the income effect on demand for X is zero, i.e., epxu = e∗pxu∗ = 0)
in the rest of the paper. Hence, from the third equation in the above system we have
dpx
dt
= − S
′
β + β∗
> 0
Substituting this into the first equation in the above system we have
du
dt
=
1
eu
S′(euαδ − t) + 1
eu
[
S′(euαδ − t) + S∗′euαˆδ +Mx
] [ S′
β + β∗
]
(25)
Note that our model nests the case of no externality, i.e., when δ = 0, and also the case of no
transboundary pollution, i.e., αˆ = 0. In the case of no externality, the sign of the above expression
depends on Mx. If the country is an importer of X, then Mx > 0 implying
(
du
dt
)
t=0
< 0. Thus
the standard terms of trade argument applies, whereby a large country should subsidize domestic
production of the importable if the use of commercial policies is prohibited.
Now suppose that the home and foreign countries are identical. Hence, if t = t∗ then Mx = 0.
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Evaluating Eq. (25) at the autarky solution, ta = euαδ, we have
(
du
dt
)
t=ta
= S∗
′
αˆδ
[
S′
β + β∗
]
< 0 (26)
Intuitively, the result in Eq. (26) follows because increases in domestic taxes increase foreign
output and hence foreign pollution, i.e., dx
∗
dt > 0. Thus, carbon leakage, in our symmetric model,
leads to lower environmental taxes for both countries under free trade. We summarize our results
in the following proposition
Proposition 1. If two countries have identical preferences and technology, and ta is the optimal
autarky tax in each country, then under free trade each country’s optimal response is to choose a
tax rate less than ta.
This policy is optimal for both countries. Hence, assuming identical solutions and uniqueness,
we have
Proposition 2. With identical countries, if countries set environmental taxes non-cooperatively
but otherwise pursue free trade, then
1. there is a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, and
2. both countries are worse off under free trade relative to autarky.
Note that even if the countries are not identical, by continuity, if they are sufficiently similar
then the above results hold. Thus,
Corollary 1. If countries are sufficiently similar then a move from autarky to free trade will
make both countries worse off if environmental taxes are set non-cooperatively.
An important implication of this is that the more similar countries are, the more likely it is
that trade liberalization will lead to higher pollution and lower welfare in both countries. The
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primary role of environmental policies should be regulation of pollution. However, in the absence
of tariffs large countries have an incentive to use environmental policies as a secondary trade
barrier to manipulate the terms of trade. There is another role for environmental policies in
the presence of transboundary pollution; change in world prices due to domestic environmental
regulations can increase foreign emissions via carbon leakage, which reduces the benefits from
tighter domestic policies. The motive behind the under-regulation of the polluting sector is to
reduce transboundary pollution from abroad, which partly offsets the benefits of tighter domestic
pollution policies. In equilibrium, in our symmetric model, there is no terms of trade motive; it is
purely the incentive to reduce carbon leakage that leads countries to lower domestic environmental
tax, resulting in a race to the bottom in environmental policy.
5.2 Quotas
Now suppose both governments use command and control policies, such as upper bounds on
emissions (or output), instead of taxes. Hence x ≤ L and x∗ ≤ L∗, where L and L∗ are the
production limits in the home and foreign countries, respectively. Governments simultaneously
and non-cooperatively choose their quota levels to maximize welfare. Define the (shadow) value
of a quota in the home and foreign countries as τˆ ≡ px − p and τˆ∗ ≡ px − p∗, respectively, where
p (p∗) is the producer price of X in the home (foreign) country. If the quotas are auctioned off
or traded domestically then τˆ and τˆ∗ are the market prices of the quotas in the home and foreign
countries, respectively. The home and foreign GNP functions are, respectively,
R(px − τˆ), with Rp(px − τˆ) ≡ L; R∗(px − τˆ∗), with R∗p∗(px − τˆ∗) ≡ L∗
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Equilibrium is described by
e(px, u+ δ{αx+ αˆx∗}) = R(px − τˆ) + τˆL (27)
e∗(px, u∗ + δ{αˆx+ αx∗}) = R∗(px − τˆ∗) + τˆ∗L∗ (28)
epx + e
∗
px = x+ x
∗ (29a)
x = Rpx−τˆ ≤ L (29b)
x∗ = R∗px−τˆ∗ ≤ L∗ (29c)
where Eq.’s (27), (28) and (29) are the income constraints for the home and foreign countries, and
the market clearing conditions, respectively. The quota rents (revenues) are rebated lump-sum
to consumers. We assume that the quotas bind; hence, τˆ , τˆ∗ > 0, and Eq.’s (29b) and (29c) hold
with equality.
Taking the total differential of Eq. (27) we have
epxdpx + eudu+ euαδdx+ euαˆδdx
∗ = Rp(dpx − dτˆ) + Ldτˆ + τˆ dL;
dx = dL, and Rp(px − τˆ) = L (30)
Similarly totally differentiating Eq. (28) we have
e∗pxdpx + e
∗
u∗du
∗ + e∗u∗αδdx
∗ + e∗u∗αˆδdx = R
∗
p∗(dpx − dτˆ∗) + L∗dτˆ∗ + τˆ∗dL∗;
dx∗ = dL∗, and R∗p∗(px − τˆ∗) = L∗ (31)
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Differentiating Eq. (27) with respect to L gives the home country’s best response function as
a function of the foreign country’s quota
eu
du
dL
= (Rp − epx)
dpx
dL
+ (τˆ − euαδ) dx
dL
− euαˆδ dx
∗
dL
(32)
The first and second terms are the terms of trade and domestic pollution effects, respectively,
while the last term is the effect of changes in the incidence of transboundary pollution on domestic
welfare. The terms of trade effect depends on whether the polluting good is an import of the home
country. Issuing an additional permit, given that the quota binds, increases domestic production
and domestic emissions. If foreign production changes following changes in domestic quotas, then
it affects domestic welfare via a change in the incidence of transboundary pollution.
The foreign country’s best response function is given by
e∗u∗
du∗
dL∗
= (R∗p∗ − e∗px)
dpx
dL∗
+ (τˆ∗ − e∗u∗αδ)
dx∗
dL∗
− e∗u∗αˆδ
dx
dL∗
(33)
Eq.’s (32) and (33) can be solved for the optimal autarky production quotas. In autarky domestic
consumption equals domestic production and the quota binds, i.e., epx(.) = Rp(.) = L, and
foreign output is independent of domestic policy, i.e., dx
∗
dL = 0; hence, from Eq. (30), we have
eu
du
dL = τˆ − euαδ. Since eu > 0, the domestic production tax equivalent of the optimal autarky
production quota for the home country is
τˆa = euαδ (34)
Similarly the production tax equivalent of the optimal autarky output quota for the foreign
country is
τˆa∗ = e∗u∗αδ (35)
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Now consider each country’s optimal non-cooperative environmental policy, given a commit-
ment to free trade. Let xa and xa∗ be the autarky output (quota) levels in the home and foreign
countries, respectively. Further, suppose that the countries are identical. Hence, if τˆ , τˆ∗ > 0,
L = xa = xa∗ = L∗, then ∃N(xa) such that, for L ∈ N [xa], L∗ binds. Hence
(
dx∗
dL
)
L=xa
= 0 (36)
If L∗ = xa∗ = xa = L, then at L = xa, x(L,L∗) = xa = epx , i.e., L = Rp(.) = epx(.). Evaluating
Eq. (32) at the autarky solution, L = xa, we have
(
du
dL
)
L=xa
= 0 (37)
Hence, for our symmetric specification, the optimal domestic output and the equivalent output
tax are the same in the free trade equilibrium as in the autarky equilibrium. We summarize our
result in the following proposition
Proposition 3. Suppose governments use production (or pollution) limits, rather than taxes to
regulate pollution. Then, in the symmetric equilibrium, the autarky and free trade equilibria will
be the same and there is no race to the bottom in environmental policy.
To see why this result follows, suppose the foreign government imposes an upper bound on
output (emissions) equal to the autarky level, i.e., it regulates output such that x∗ ≤ L∗ = xa∗ .
For any domestic output x < xa, the reduced world output of good x (compared to the autarky
situation) results in higher consumer (hence, producer) prices than in the (symmetric) autarky
equilibrium and so the foreign output upper bound will bind. As the home country increases its
permissible output limit, L, in the domain L < xa, the foreign production limit continues to bind
and thus dx
∗
dL = 0 in the domain L < x
a. Furthermore, at L = xa, a (small) increase in L leads to
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a (small) decline in world consumer prices (to below autarkic levels) but foreign output is still not
affected because the consumer price is above the producer price8. Hence, in the neighborhood of
L = xa, we have dx
∗
dL = 0, i.e., changes in the domestic quota level do not affect foreign output
(hence, foreign emissions). Recall that the driving force behind the race to the bottom in taxes
was the motive to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. Since changes in domestic
policy do not influence foreign emissions, countries follow the same policies as in autarky. Thus,
although typically there is a presumption that price-based policies are superior to command and
control policies, in a strategic setting that need not be the case, and the equivalence between the
two in closed economies breaks down with the possibility of trade between countries.
5.3 Tradable Quotas
We analyze the interaction between goods trade and permit trade, and consider the situation in
which governments regulate emissions using quotas but, following Copeland and Taylor (1995),
these quotas are tradable across the countries, i.e., countries practice free trade not only in
goods, but also in permits. Thus, producer prices of goods and market values of quotas are
equalized across countries, i.e., p = p∗ = px − τ , where τ is the market price of production
quotas. Governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose quota limits to maximize
welfare. Equilibrium is now described by
e(px, u+ δ{αx+ αˆx∗}) = R(px − τ) + τL (38)
e∗(px, u∗ + δ{αˆx+ αx∗}) = R∗(px − τ) + τL∗ (39)
8The market value of the foreign production quota, if tradable, will fall but remain positive, as the increase in
domestic output of x lowers the gap between the demand and supply price. However, this has no impact on the
home economy and, due to symmetry, the terms of trade effect around L = xa are zero.
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epx + e
∗
px = x+ x
∗ (40a)
x+ x∗ = Rpx−τ +R
∗
px−τ ≤ L+ L∗ (40b)
where Eq.’s (38), (39) and (40) are the balance of trade constraints for the home and foreign
countries, and the market clearing conditions, respectively. We assume that the quotas bind;
hence, τ > 0 and
epx + e
∗
px = Rpx−τ +R
∗
px−τ = L+ L
∗ (41)
Note that, as shown in the previous section, the production tax equivalent of the optimal
autarky quota in the home and foreign countries are, respectively, τa = euαδ and τa∗ = e∗u∗αδ.
Taking total differential of Eq. (38) we have
epxdpx + eudu+ euαδdx+ euαˆδdx
∗ = Rp(dpx − dτ) + Ldτ + τdL;
dx+ dx∗ = dL+ dL∗, and Rp(px − τ) +R∗p(px − τ) = L+ L∗ (42)
Totally differentiating Eq. (39) we get
e∗pxdpx + e
∗
u∗du
∗ + e∗u∗αδdx
∗ + e∗u∗αˆδdx = R
∗
p(dpx − dτ) + L∗dτ + τdL∗;
dx+ dx∗ = dL+ dL∗, and Rp(px − τ) +R∗p(px − τ) = L+ L∗ (43)
The best response function of the home country in terms of the foreign country’s quota is
derived by differentiating Eq. (38) with respect to L
eu
du
dL
= (Rp − epx)
dpx
dL
+ (L−Rp) dτ
dL
+ (τ − euαδ) dx
dL
+ (τ − euαˆδ)dx
∗
dL
(44)
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The net domestic welfare effect of issuing an additional quota depends on a number of different
effects. The first term, the terms of trade effect, depends on the pattern of trade, while the
second term is the quota revenue effect. The third term is the effect on domestic welfare through
changes in domestic emissions: if some of the new quotas are used domestically, then domestic
emissions increase. The last term, the transboundary pollution effect, depends on whether foreign
production increases with an increase in domestic quotas and on the public bad characteristic of
pollution.
The foreign country’s best response function is
e∗u∗
du∗
dL∗
= (R∗p − e∗px)
dpx
dL∗
+ (L∗ −R∗p)
dτ
dL∗
+ (τ − e∗u∗αδ)
dx∗
dL∗
+ (τ − e∗u∗αˆδ)
dx
dL∗
(45)
Differentiating Eq. (41) with respect to L we have9
dpx
dL
=
dpx
dL∗
=
1
epxpx + e∗pxpx
< 0 (46)
and
dpx
dL
− dτ
dL
=
1
S′ + S∗′
(47)
Furthermore, x∗ = R∗p(px − τ) implies (using Eq. (47))
dx∗
dL
= S∗
′
(
dpx
dL
− dτ
dL
) =
S∗′
S′ + S∗′
∈ (0, 1) (48)
Suppose, as before, that the countries are identical; hence, if L = xa = xa∗ = L∗, then
epx(.) = Rp(.) = L. Evaluating Eq. (44) at the autarky solution, L = xa, we have
(
eu
du
dL
)
L=xa
= (τa − euαˆδ) dx
∗
dL
(49)
9Recall that we assume quasi-linear preferences, so epxu = e
∗
pxu∗ = 0.
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(τa − euαˆδ) > 0 if α > αˆ, and Eq. (48) ⇒ dx∗dL > 0; thus, Eq. (49) implies (since eu > 0)
(
du
dL
)
L=xa
> 0 if α > αˆ (50)
We summarize our result in the following proposition
Proposition 4. If two countries have identical preferences and technology, and if domestic emis-
sions result in a higher marginal damage than transboundary pollution, i.e., α > αˆ, then under
free trade in both goods and production (or emission) permits, each country’s optimal response is
to choose a quota level higher than the equilibrium autarky level, La.
As this policy is optimal for both countries, assuming identical solutions and uniqueness, we
have the following
Proposition 5. With identical countries, if the marginal damage from domestic emissions is
higher than that from transboundary pollution, i.e., α > αˆ, and countries set production (or
emission) quotas non-cooperatively but otherwise pursue free trade in goods and permits, then
1. there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy, and
2. both countries are worse off under free trade relative to autarky.
If the countries are not identical, as long as they are sufficiently similar, then, by continuity,
the above results hold.
Corollary 2. If countries are sufficiently similar and production (or emission) quotas are set
non-cooperatively, then a move from autarky to free trade in both goods and quotas will make
both countries worse off if the marginal damage from domestic emissions is higher than that from
transboundary pollution, i.e., if α > αˆ.
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Thus, the more similar countries are, the more likely it is that both countries will relax their
environmental policies and both will lose from trade liberalization, if α > αˆ. Note that with
identical countries, assuming identical and unique solutions, Eq. (49) implies
(
du
dL
)
L=xa
= 0 if α = αˆ (51)
Thus, we have
Proposition 6. If pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if α = αˆ, then, in the symmetric
equilibrium of this model, the free trade equilibrium with tradable permits is the same as the autarky
and nontradable permit equilibria and there is no race to the bottom in environmental policy.
Proposition 6 reflects the result in Copeland and Taylor (1995) where, due to the pure global
public bad nature of pollution, the strategic and non-strategic free trade equilibria coincide. In
autarky issuing an additional permit results in an accompanying increase in pollution by α units,
given that the quota binds. However, with free trade in goods and permits, issuing an additional
quota leads to a less than proportional increase in domestic production as some of the additional
quotas are used in the foreign country; now pollution increases by α− S∗
′
S′+S∗′
(α− αˆ) < α if α > αˆ.
This leads to a race to the bottom in pollution policies. However, when pollution is a pure global
public bad, i.e., α = αˆ, the source of emissions does not matter as the marginal damage is the
same irrespective of the origin of pollution. Hence, there is no incentive to shift emissions to the
other country and there is no race to the bottom.
In Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003) countries, by assumption, do not trade and taxes and
quotas are found to be equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in open economies,
even if there is no trade in equilibrium, due to carbon leakage and the strategic interaction among
countries. This highlights how results that hold in a closed economy setting do not necessarily
hold in an open economy setting even if there is no trade in equilibrium. Furthermore, in our
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model the only driving force is the carbon leakage effect. In previous models, including Kiyono
and Ishikawa (2004), there have been other motives at play in equilibrium, but we have isolated
the pure effects of carbon leakage and how the choice of policy instrument affects the outcome of
a strategic game.
5.4 Pollution and Welfare
In this section we derive the optimal (equivalent) taxes and compare welfare under different policy
instruments. The optimal production tax under autarky is ta = euαδ, while the Pareto efficient
tax is
te = euαδ + e∗u∗αˆδ > t
a (52)
In autarky taxes and quotas are equivalent, i.e.,
ta = τˆa = τa = euαδ (53)
Hence, we have
Proposition 7. Under autarky the choice of policy instrument to regulate pollution does not
matter, i.e., environmental taxes and quotas are equivalent.
This result is similar to Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003), who find that in closed economies,
emission taxes and quotas are equivalent. When the policy instrument is an environmental tax,
the optimal production tax for the home country can be calculated using Eq. (25). Setting dudt = 0,
we have the optimal free trade production tax
t = euαδ +
S∗′euαˆδ +Mx
epxpx + β∗
23
As before, assuming identical countries, and identical and unique solutions, we have Mx = 0 and
t = euαδ +
S∗′euαˆδ
epxpx + β∗
< ta (54)
With internationally nontradable permits, assuming identical countries, the autarky and free
trade equilibria coincide, and the production tax equivalent of the optimal free trade quota is
τˆ = euαδ = ta (55)
Finally, with internationally tradable permits, the production tax equivalent of the optimal
free trade quota can be found by equating dudL to zero in Eq. (44)
τ = euαδ +
epx −Rp
epxpx + e∗pxpx
+
(L−Rp)(β + β∗)
(epxpx + e∗pxpx)(S′ + S∗
′)
+
S∗′
S′ + S∗′
(euαˆδ − euαδ)
Again, assuming identical countries, and identical and unique solutions, we have epx(.) = Rp(.) =
L, which implies that the production tax equivalent of the optimal free trade quota is
τ = euαδ +
S∗′
S′ + S∗′
(euαˆδ − euαδ) (56)
If α > αˆ, i.e., if pollution is not a pure global public bad, then τ < ta, while τ = ta if α = αˆ.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that τ > t.
The optimal (equivalent) environmental taxes in the different cases are related as follows
te > ta = τˆ ≥ τ > t (57)
Note that ta = τˆ = τ if α = αˆ. We summarize our results in the following proposition
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Proposition 8. If identical countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose pollution poli-
cies but otherwise pursue free trade, and the marginal damage from domestic emissions is higher
than that form transboundary pollution, i.e., α > αˆ, then
1. the (equivalent) environmental tax rate is the highest (equal to the autarkic level) when
internationally nontradable quotas are the policy instruments, followed by the case when
internationally tradable quotas are used, and it is the lowest when taxes are used to regulate
pollution;
2. pollution is the highest when the policy instrument is an environmental tax, followed by the
case when internationally tradable quotas are used, and is the lowest (equal to the autarkic
level) when internationally nontradable quotas are the policy instruments.
Given our symmetric specification, and that no trade takes place in equilibrium, it follows
that welfare (W ) under the different policy instruments can be ranked as follows
W efficient > W autarky =W quota ≥W tradable quota > W tax (58)
Hence,
Proposition 9. If identical countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose pollution poli-
cies but otherwise pursue free trade, then
1. the internationally nontradable quota equilibrium is equivalent to the autarky equilibrium
and strictly welfare-superior to the internationally tradable quota equilibrium, which is, in
turn, strictly welfare-superior to the tax equilibrium if the marginal damage from domestic
emissions is higher than that from transboundary pollution, i.e., if α > αˆ;
2. the internationally nontradable and tradable quota equilibria are equivalent to the autarky
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equilibrium, and strictly welfare-dominate the tax equilibrium if pollution is a pure global
public bad, i.e., if α = αˆ.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have used a very simple model to highlight the effect of trade liberalization in the presence
of transboundary pollution. The autarky equilibrium is inefficient because countries do not inter-
nalize the transboundary effects of domestic emissions. The Pareto efficient equilibrium requires
both countries to internalize the effects of transboundary pollution and is, naturally, welfare im-
proving. The movement from autarky to free trade can be welfare reducing. If countries are
identical and environmental taxes are set non-cooperatively, then carbon leakage, by increasing
foreign emissions under trade, reduces the benefits of tighter domestic environmental policy. Al-
though, in equilibrium, there is no trade in our symmetric model, the possibility of trade provides
the opportunity to influence world prices and influence foreign production and emissions, thereby
leading to a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off
relative to autarky.
When quotas are the policy instruments, changes in domestic policy do not affect foreign
production (hence, foreign emissions) and there is no incentive to distort domestic policy. Even
when the quotas are tradable across countries, if pollution is a pure global public bad, then there
is no race to the bottom. However, if pollution is not a pure global public bad, then there is a
race to the bottom in environmental policy with internationally tradable permits, which, again,
makes both countries worse off as compared to autarky. Here the lower marginal damage from
increased issue of pollution permits under free trade as compared to autarky is the driving force
behind the race to the bottom.
The nontradable quota equilibrium welfare-dominates the tradable quota equilibrium, which,
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in turn, strictly welfare-dominates the tax equilibrium. Pollution is the highest when taxes are
the strategic variables and the lowest when internationally nontradable quotas are the policy
instruments. Although we have used identical countries to isolate the role of carbon leakage, it
should be clear that, by continuity, our results hold even if countries are not identical, provided
they are sufficiently similar. We find that quantity based tools are welfare-superior to price based
tools. Other factors, such as imperfect competition or imperfect information, might favor price-
based policies. Hence, this warrants a more careful analysis of the choice and restriction of policy
instruments in the presence of transboundary externalities and non-cooperative policy settings.
The importance of the proper choice of policy instruments becomes more crucial the more similar
countries are, because certain instruments may result in both countries being worse off with trade
liberalization, while others do not.
We have assumed that pollution causes disutility, but does not affect the production possibility
set. Allowing for the latter might result in some interesting insights with respect to the equivalence
between policy instruments. Another possible avenue of future research is to allow for imperfect
information between countries, and verify if the welfare rankings of policy instruments derived
in this paper hold in a sequential game, where countries try to infer about the preference or
technology of each other from their choice of policy instrument.
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